What is Hamas?
20/01/2009
Written by Sara Roy
Although controversial and
polemic, Sara Roy's July 2007 reflections on Hamas
present a picture of a complex organisation that should
invite a sophisticated policy response. (Originally
published in the Midlle East Policy Council Journal)
Book Review Hamas: Politics, Charity and
Terrorism in the Service of Jihad by Matthew Levitt.
Yale University Press, in cooperation with the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006. 324
pages, $26.00, hardcover.
At the beginning of the first Palestinian uprising, I
was living in Gaza and spent much time in the refugee
camps interviewing families about the political and
socioeconomic changes taking place around them. Despite
the harsh living situation, Palestinians were filled
with a palpable sense of hope and possibility that has
since evaporated. Hamas was then struggling to create a
popular constituency, despite overwhelming support among
Palestinians for secular nationalism. That was 18 years
ago, and neither I nor anyone else ever thought that
Hamas would one day emerge as a major political actor:
democratically winning legislative elections, defeating
the majority Fatah party and heading a Palestinian
government.
In his recent book, Matthew Levitt, who is deputy
assistant secretary for intelligence and analysis at the
U.S. Department of the Treasury and an expert in
financial counterterrorism, argues that Hamas is
strictly a terrorist organization that is not only a
domestic threat but a global one, a part of an
international jihad network with links to al-Qaeda that
must be met with force. He further argues — and this is
the core of his book — that despite the existence of
differentiated political, social and military sectors
within Hamas, they are all part of the same “apparatus
of terror.”
Levitt devotes significant attention to attacking the
Islamist social sector (dawa) and Hamas’s charitable
institutions. It is the principle aim of his book to
show how Hamas uses its extensive social-service
network-mosques, schools, kindergartens, orphanages,
hospitals, clinics, sports clubs, youth clubs-to further
its primary political agenda, which he claims is the
destruction of Israel. He argues that through its social
support structure and services, “Hamas leverages the
appreciation (and indebtedness) it earns through social
welfare activities to garner support — both political
and logistical — for its terrorist activities.” Levitt
summarizes his argument as follows: “The general
deprivation of the Palestinian people in the
Israeli-occupied territories predisposes them to favor
the much-needed social support that Hamas provides.” He
continues, “In addition to purchasing goodwill,
charities also create a built-in logistical support
umbrella underneath which terrorist operations are
sheltered and operate.” He explains that the dawa
network operationally supports terrorism through
recruitment, employment and financing and by providing
institutional legitimacy.
His evidence, at times interesting, particularly with
regard to Hamas’s external sources of financing, is more
often than not based on assumption, extrapolation and
generalization. For example, as evidence for how
religious organizations raise money for Palestinian
terrorism, Levitt quotes from a pamphlet produced by a
Quranic memorization center that was sponsored by the
Ramallah-al Bireh charity committee. The pamphlet listed
30 ways to enter heaven, including “Jihad for the sake
of Allah by fighting with one’s soul and money.”
In another example of how hospitals are used to support
terrorism, Levitt briefly describes the Dar al-Salam
Hospital: “According to information cited by the FBI,”
the hospital is considered a Hamas institution because
it was founded with “Hamas funds and protection.” But
Levitt fails to provide any real evidence of these funds
or how and why they are considered “Hamas.” The
assumption is that these ties, even if they are shown to
exist, are inherently evil and can be nothing else.
In a chapter on how the dawa teaches terror and
radicalizes Palestinian society, Levitt writes,
“Recipients of Hamas financial aid or social services
are less likely to turn down requests from the
organization such as allowing their homes to serve as
safe houses for Hamas fugitives, ferrying fugitives,
couriering funds or weapons, storing and maintaining
explosives, and more.” He cites as evidence for this
sweeping statement one resident of Jabalya refugee camp
in Gaza who fed Hamas militants daily. The possibility
that Palestinians receive support from Hamas
institutions without preconditions or that popular
support requires more than the lure of financial
incentives and free social services does not enter
Levitt’s argument. Levitt also claims, “When angry,
frustrated or humiliated Palestinians regularly listen
to sermons in mosques in which Jews, Israelis and even
Americans are depicted as enemies of Islam and
Palestine, Hamas’s official policy may not restrain
individual enthusiasm.” One wonders how Mr. Levitt knows
these things, given that he appears never to have
stepped inside a Hamas institution in Gaza or the West
Bank or to have conducted any fieldwork at all.
While these arguments are oft-repeated in today’s media,
Levitt does little to address research that supports a
very different conclusion regarding the Hamas dawa. Some
of the key findings of this research point to
institutional features that demonstrate no preference
for religion or politics over other ideologies,
particularly in programmatic work; an approach to
institutional work that advocates incrementalism,
moderation, order and stability; a philosophical and
practical desire for productivity and professionalism
that shuns radical change and emphasizes community
development and civic restoration over political
violence; and no evidence of any formal attempt to
impose an Islamic model of political, social, legal or
religious behavior, or to create an alternative Islamic
or Islamist conception of society.
While there can be no doubt that, since its inception,
Hamas has engaged in violence and armed struggle and has
been the primary force behind the horrific suicide
bombings inside Israel, Levitt’s presentation reduces
this increasingly complex and sophisticated organization
to an insular, one-dimensional and seemingly mindless
entity dedicated solely to violence, terrorism and
Israel’s destruction. To fully understand the current
political stature of Hamas, it is necessary to closely
examine the dramatic transitions that have occurred
within the organization itself, among Palestinians with
respect to their society, and in Palestine’s
relationship with Israel.
From the point of view of Hamas, Palestine is an Arab
and Islamic land that fell to colonial control with the
demise of the Ottoman Empire. The establishment of the
State of Israel is viewed as a way to perpetuate
colonial authority over the Muslim homeland and is
therefore illegitimate. As victims of colonialism, Hamas
argues that Palestinians have the right to resist and
struggle to regain their homeland and freedom, viewing
this as a local and nationalist struggle. Now, almost
two decades after its birth, Hamas has grown in size and
popularity. While changes have not been made to its
frame of reference or objectives, its political
discourse has become more refined and streamlined,
particularly with regard to its relations with local
groups, political factions, other religious communities
and other nations.
Unfortunately, Matthew Levitt’s book does not address
the critical evolutionary processes — particularly with
regard to its organizational structure and political,
social and economic role in Palestinian society — that
have characterized the Palestinian Islamist movement and
Hamas’s rise to power. The ability of Hamas to
reinterpret itself over time through processes of
radicalization, de-radicalization, de-militarization and
re-radicalization is a pronounced and common theme in
its historical evolution. Levitt neglects to address the
significance behind this commitment to reinterpretation.
His analysis aims simply to demonize Hamas, and he
discounts the critical connections between changing
patterns of protest and structures of society, competing
visions of a Palestinian social and political order, and
contesting Islamic and secular definitions of meaning
and legitimacy. The synergy among these forces has
characterized the history and growth of Palestinian
Islamism.
Israel’s military occupation, which has long been the
defining context for Palestinian life, is almost absent
from Levitt’s book. Hamas’s popularity and growing
empowerment derive from its role as a resistance
organization, fighting against an occupation that is now
40 years old. Israel’s steady expropriation,
fragmentation and division of Palestinian lands;
settlement construction and expansion; closure
restrictions and destruction of the Palestinian economy
are not part of Levitt’s discussion, nor is the right of
the Palestinians to resist these measures. In those few
instances where the occupation is mentioned, it is
couched in terms that acknowledge Palestinian hardship —
a reality exploited by Hamas — but justified as a
response to terrorism. In the absence of any serious
examination of Israel’s occupation, Levitt’s portrayal
of the rise of Hamas is completely detached from the
context within which it was produced and shaped.
Despite evidence to the contrary, the organization is
also described as a movement incapable of
transformation, ignoring the improvements in Hamas’s
political discourse regarding political compromise with
the State of Israel and resolution of the conflict.
During the period of the Oslo peace process, for
example, some dramatic changes occurred within Hamas.
The organization was moving away from the extreme and a
position of confrontation towards one that was more
centrist and moderate. This shift was characterized by a
reorientation in policy and strategic emphasis from
political/military action to social works and community
development. Accompanying this shift was a redefinition
of the nature of the Palestinian struggle, which was no
longer for political or military power per se but for
defining new social arrangements and appropriate
cultural and institutional models that would meet social
needs without resort to violence. Similarly, the
Islamist movement was not advancing a policy of
isolation but was calling for greater accommodation and
cooperation with both domestic and international actors.
Since Hamas’s victory in the January 2006 legislative
elections, there has been a further evolution in its
political thinking — as evidenced in some of its key
political documents — characterized by a strong emphasis
on state-building and programmatic work, greater
refinement with regard to its position on a two-state
solution and the role of resistance, and a progressive
de-emphasis on religion. (See Khaled Hroub, “A ‘New
Hamas’ Through Its New Documents,” Journal of Palestine
Studies, 34 (4) (Summer 2006)). These are absent from
Levitt’s discussion. Levitt also overlooks questions
that are vital to any analysis of Hamas, especially at
present. To name just a few, what were Hamas’s
ideological, philosophical and structural boundaries?
How and why were they reset and expanded? What is the
role of religion as opposed to politics in Islamist
thought and practice, particularly in the public sphere?
Are religion and politics truly unified? Can Hamas
reconcile faith and ideology with a demand for a place
in the political system?
Levitt’s book has many serious flaws and merits a
detailed critique that extends well beyond the scope of
this review. His is not a work of analysis or
scholarship, to say the least, and despite certain
points that are interesting and accurate, anyone wishing
to gain a substantive, reasoned and critical
understanding of Hamas would do well to look elsewhere.
Main Page
Return to Gaza Page
Top of the page